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A B S T R A C T
The simultaneous localisation and globalisation of ‘terrorist threats' and cross-border criminality have led to
increased expansion of surveillance activities and greater cross-border police and judicial cooperation, placing a
greater priority on these activities within the political agenda of the EU. In this scenario, the expansion of
technological systems for surveillance and monitoring, and the large-scale exchange of citizens’ personal data
play a pivotal role in the “fight against crime”. This paper explores the multiplicity of data protection regimes in
different EU Member States within the framework of the Prüm system. While EU regulations establish minimum
standards for personal data flows at the transnational level, local and domestic practices are extremely het-
erogeneous.
Based on analysis of 37 interviews conducted with professionals involved in the automated exchange of
forensic genetic profiles, this paper provides empirical data that highlights the tensions between the local and
the global within DNA data exchanges across the EU. These tensions relate to differentiated sociotechnical
imaginaries regarding the protection of personal data flowing between Member-States. In sum, this paper
analyses the potential threats to human rights created by the exchange of personal data with regards to issues of
privacy and data protection.
1. Introduction: the European landscape
The Schengen Agreement1 was signed on June 14, 1985, aiming to
abolish all internal borders within the European Union, leaving just an
external border. The Schengen area represents a territory that guaran-
tees the free movement of persons. However, facilitated mobility of
persons has posed several challenges to the European Union, in parti-
cular, those related to security concerns at the transnational level. For
example, security-related issues came to the fore as a result of terrorist
attacks in several European cities.2 The scenario of increasing mobility
of citizens in the European area, combined with various threats to
European Union security, has culminated in the expansion of surveil-
lance systems and greater cross-border police and judicial cooperation.
Given the context of insecurity experienced by the European Union,
the implementation of networks of sophisticated technological systems
for identification and control of “suspect populations” have benefited
from renewed legitimacy in the public arena.1–3 The following ex-
amples are representative of these large IT systems. The European
Asylum Dactyloscopy Database (EURODAC)3 was created in 2003 with
the aim of examining asylum applications by comparing fingerprint
datasets. The Visa Information System4 (VIS), in operation since 2011,
aims to share data about visas between Member-States in the Schengen
area. The Prüm Decisions (Council Decision 2008/615/JHA5 and
Council Decision 2008/616/JHA6) aim to foster the exchange of in-
formation related to genetic data (DNA profiles), fingerprints and ve-
hicle registration in order to combat terrorism and cross-border crime.
The adoption of various systems of surveillance has stimulated
discussion about the balance between the proportionality of surveil-
lance activities and the need to protect citizens' fundamental rights.
Some European Institutions, such as the European Agency for
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Fundamental Rights (FRA),7 have attempted to achieve a balance
through analysis of the pros and cons of different surveillance me-
chanisms/technologies. The report “Surveillance by intelligence ser-
vices: fundamental rights safeguards and remedies in the EU”,8 pro-
duced in 2017 by the FRA, documents an attempt to balance individual
rights and collective safety. In brief, the FRA explored the challenges
that new surveillance technologies pose to the fundamental rights of
European citizens. The report emphasised the importance of surveil-
lance for the security of Member States but also mentioned that this
practice could be harmful to several fundamental rights, specifically
privacy and data protection. In addition, disproportionate surveillance
could also pose risks to democracy and citizenship due to transparency
issues. The aforementioned document was requested by the European
Parliament in 2013 following the widely publicised case of Edward
Snowden. He was a US government employee working for the country's
intelligence services (NSA), who until then had been anonymous.4,5
Snowden's revelations brought into the public sphere the massive and
disproportionate surveillance of ordinary citizens and leaders within
the European Union and the USA.4,6 These revelations created a space
to reflect upon surveillance practices operated at a dimension that was
not envisioned by US citizens, nor by the European Union. The re-
velations had two main consequences. First, European countries' trust
in the US came into question. Second, the revelations weakened Eur-
opean citizens' trust in their own security agencies.4
Looking specifically at efforts to reduce crime, the opening of the
European Union's internal borders led to the adoption of several se-
curity strategies. One of these strategies was the implementation of
forensic DNA databases and, later, the transnational exchange of the
genetic information stored on these databases for criminal investigation
purposes.7–11 The creation of forensic DNA databases sometimes led to
debates on ethical, social and political challenges, particularly in terms
of privacy and data protection. Some authors argued that expansion of
these databases was allied to an increase in control and surveillance
over individuals and would result in the criminalisation and vulner-
ability of certain populations,12–15 and consequently, would increase
their stigmatisation.16–19 This article intends to be a reflection on the
sociotechnical imaginaries20 of data protection performed in this con-
text of transnational cooperation and more expansive surveillance.
The paper will cover the most representative topics about privacy
and data protection in the Prüm system that were shared by the in-
terviewees. First, participants found that the judicial system is more
effective in protecting personal data, but exchanging data via this
method is generally slower (this is one of the biggest criticisms of the
Prüm system). Second, the decision to exchange personal data (step 2)
varies between Member-States. Some countries choose to exchange
information about a suspect regardless of the crime, but other countries
only exchange information in certain situations. This relates to the re-
levance of sending personal data to third countries for crimes that,
according to NCPs, may not be sufficiently serious to justify the ex-
change. In this way, countries that only share information when re-
lating to serious crimes, have a narrower conception of the data that
they must protect. The third topic brought up by some interviewees had
to do with the need for trust between Member-States within the Prüm
system. For the Member-States, it is imperative that countries trust that
the personal data that they are going to send will be treated in ac-
cordance with good privacy and data protection practices. The parti-
cipants considered that if there is a lack of trust, transnational co-
operation may be more limited and, as such, may not achieve its full
potential. On the last topic, the interviewees expressed their opinion on
the expansive or restrictive approach of data exchange in their coun-
tries.
2. The Prüm system
The transnational exchange of information from national DNA da-
tabases for criminal intelligence purposes is operated through the so-
called Prüm Treaty.21,22 It was originally signed in 2005 by seven
Member States of the European Union - Austria, Belgium, France,
Germany, Luxembourg, the Netherlands and Spain - and later by Fin-
land, Italy and Portugal. The Treaty was later transposed into European
Union law, in 2008.9 This decision made it compulsory for all Member-
States to set up and maintain databases for the mutual access and ex-
change of DNA profiles, fingerprints and vehicle registration data. For
the purposes of this article, only the exchange of information related to
DNA profiles will be considered. The Treaty aimed to foster technical
and scientific standardisation, and also legislative harmonisation, in
order to guarantee the protection of the right to privacy. In this way,
the sociodemographic information of an individual is dissociated from
his or her genetic profile when a country searches the DNA database of
another country.
The correspondence between DNA profiles in the Prüm system is
achieved using a two-step approach.7,10,23 In step 1, Member States
confirm whether or not the DNA profile of their database matches the
profile that exists in another Member State's database. After a hit/match
confirmation, this will trigger step 2 if requested, i.e. the exchange of
further information about the DNA's owner. The information exchange
is performed in accordance with the data protection law of both
countries24 as well as the minimum criteria established by the European
Commission for data protection. The two-step process allows for eva-
luation of national legislation, in order to check whether the exchange
falls within legal parameters, and confirm whether or not the data
protection measures are in force with respect to the exchange of per-
sonal data7(p316).
The Prüm system, as a technical-scientific standardisation element,
was intended to facilitate transnational cooperation between police and
judicial institutions, by neutralising legal, cultural and political differ-
ences in the different Member States10,11,25(pp4−5). The flow of in-
formation is closely dependent on the creation of standards that seek to
ensure interoperability9,17,26–28 between national forensic DNA data-
bases. However, technological and scientific harmonisation has as its
main challenge the legislative diversity of the countries of the European
Union.11,24 Even with the two-step approach established by the Prüm
System, there are different sociotechnical imaginaries20 about the per-
sonal information data that should be exchanged between Member-
States. These divergences show that European countries have different
ways of conceiving the notions of privacy and data protection of their
citizens.
The legitimation of this particular system of genetic surveillance
follows the same line of argument used to justify other technological
surveillance mechanisms. Generally speaking, political narratives re-
flect the idea that there is a need to balance individual rights (privacy
and data protection) and collective safety in order to ‘fight’ terrorism
and organised crime.26 Nevertheless, one of the criticisms of the Prüm
system concerns its transnational scope. According to several authors, it
is important that the Prüm system also covers the processing of personal
information conducted in national contexts.29 That said, National
Contact Points have different ‘epistemic cultures’30 relating to privacy
and data protection, while operating without a transnational policy
capable of accommodating different national practices when balancing
security and the protection of fundamental human rights.
7 European Agency for Fundamental Rights (FRA) - http://fra.europa.eu/en.
8 Retrieved from http://fra.europa.eu/en/publication/2017/surveillance-
intelligence-socio-lega, January 24, 2019.
9 Council Decision 2008/615/JHA and 2008/616/JHA – Retrieved from
https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=LEGISSUM%3Ajl0005
& https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?qid=1528203232723&
uri=CELEX:32008D0616, January 24, 2019.
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3. Prüm system: sociotechnical imaginaries
Science and Technology Studies scholars have critically analysed
and explored the implementation and subsequent expansion of forensic
DNA databases for criminal investigation purposes.31–35 The present
article uses the conceptual framework of STS and focuses on the con-
cept of sociotechnical imaginaries.20 This concept allows us to under-
stand the reception of science and technology by non-scientific actors
and institutions20(p119). Jasanoff and Kim describe sociotechnical ima-
ginaries as “collectively imagined forms of social life and social order
reflected in the design and fulfilment of nation-specific scientific and/or
technological projects”20(p120). With this concept, the authors moved
away from the classic notion of imagination as fantasy or illusion.36 On
the contrary, imagination, as a cultural resource, allows the projection
of goals and objectives that, in turn, guide the social actors to new ways
of life. In this sense, Jasanoff and Kim (2009) argue that “imagination
helps [to] produce systems of meaning that enables collective inter-
pretations of social reality”20(p122). The notion of sociotechnical ima-
ginaries thus allows us to understand the conceptions of social order
and priorities, in order to reduce risks. In my study, I argue that the
sociotechnical imaginaries can guide the production of laws and/or
norms to one direction regarding the transnational exchange of in-
formation from DNA profiles.
Science and technology with direct application to the objectives of
modern nation-states, such as ensuring security, have been secured by
policies that aim to ensure continual development. The establishment of
forensic DNA databases and the transnational exchange of DNA data
could be assumed to be one example. The political promotion of science
and technology has two important dimensions. Firstly, we find “na-
tional visions of desirable futures driven by science and techno-
logy”20(p121). This idea is shaped through national imaginaries related
to the transnational exchange of forensic data as a way of solving
crimes not only at a national level but also at an international one.
Secondly, there are “fears of either not realising those futures or causing
unintended harm in the pursuit of technological advances”20(p121).
Terrorist threats and criminality have put pressure on States to
improve the protection and security of their citizens. The interpreta-
tions of these risks by States are usually accompanied by ideals of ex-
pansive surveillance of individuals. Under this scenario, the appro-
priation of DNA technologies by governments aims to mitigate the risk
of crime/terrorism/illegal migration. The Prüm system could be con-
sidered to be the materialisation of the appropriation of DNA science by
political and/or police institutions which are constituted by actors -
such as the Prüm National Contact Points (hereafter NCPs) - for use in
their surveillance assemblages. Even recognising the advantages of in-
formation exchange for criminal investigation purposes, States have
concerns about potential moral threats to their citizens, threats such as
the potential misuse of forensic data or inaccurate information. Such
threats have led EU Member States to create different policies speci-
fying the criteria for DNA data exchange via the Prüm system. That
said, exploring the NCPs narratives makes it possible to map national
sociotechnical imaginaries about the Prüm system, as well as its po-
tential threats to civil liberties.
4. Methodology
This article is based on a broader project10 that explores the societal,
cultural, ethical, regulatory and political impacts of the use of forensic
DNA technologies in the European Union. The paper is anchored in a
qualitative methodology in order to capture the multidimensionality of
this object of study and to privilege the socially constructed perspec-
tives of the different social actors that are related to the empirical
subject. The conditionality of only being able to subtract pre-existing
sensitizing concepts37(p34) and not theoretical frameworks and general
working hypotheses, implies adopting research strategies that make it
possible to associate the construction of hypotheses and the elaboration
of theoretical concepts to the specific circumstances of locally situated
empirical reality. This research is guided by a systematic comparison
between analysis, empiricism and theory38 following some assumptions
of grounded theory.38 This study thus values the sociological re-
presentativeness of each case, and these seem to be generalizable to
theoretical statements and not to populations or uni-
verses39(p10),40(p248).
Interviews were conducted with professionals involved in interna-
tional police cooperation who have acted as Prüm National Contact
Points or were directly involved in the process of joining the Prüm
system. NCPs are central actors in the Prüm system. Generally, they are
responsible for conducting daily activities that allow the transnational
exchange of personal data and occupy a crucial position in decision-
making processes. In particular, NCPs are responsible for: organizing
and implementing the connections necessary to perform the automatic
data exchange with other databases (sending and receiving informa-
tion), testing the exchange with other partner countries, and managing/
reporting DNA matches. Nevertheless, the NCPs responsibilities may
vary between countries according to different organizational structures
and national legislation. Therefore, individuals operating as NCPs may
have differentiated professional and educational backgrounds and may
work in forensic laboratories as well as in police forces.
The interviews were conducted under the protocols and procedures
of the European Research Council's ethics regulations. The participants
were identified first from the public contact list provided by the
‘Working Party on Information Exchange and Data Protection’ docu-
ments,41 and then by contacting privileged informants in the area. The
participants were recruited by email, letter and telephone calls. Prior to
the interviews, all interviewees signed a written informed consent form
and agreed to be audio recorded. The data on which the analysis is
based includes 37 semi-structured interviews conducted in 22 EU
member states with 47 professionals operating in the Prüm system. The
interviews took place at the participants' workplaces or a location of
their choice and they had an average duration of 90min. All interviews
were digitally recorded, transcribed verbatim and anonymised. Editing
of the quotes was carried out whenever necessary to assure clarity of
language, while fully respecting the meaning manifested by the parti-
cipants' words.42 To protect the anonymity of the interviewees, the
country in which each interviewee was based was identified using a
letter and a number was attributed to each participant. This form of
anonymisation will be used in the interview quotes analysed in the
following sections.
The interviews included the collection of the following information:
views and experience with the implementation of Prüm at the levels of
Member States and the EU as a whole, opinions about the Prüm’ pur-
pose and contribution, ethical issues raised by the transnational ex-
change of DNA data, expectations about DNA technology development
and innovation, and perceptions related to communication with the
public. For the present article, we analyse the interviewees’ perspec-
tives related to ethical issues that refer to notions of privacy and data
protection in the Prüm system.
Relevant quotes revealing the participants’ narratives about the
relevance of the procedures adopted for the exchange of personal data
through the Prüm system were coded and subjected to multiple read-
ings, in order to develop an in-depth understanding of the socio-
technical imaginaries regarding privacy and data protection articulated
by the N CPs. These quotes were systematically compared, contrasted,
synthesised and coded by theme and thematic category using the
principles of grounded theory43 and interpreted using a qualitative
content analysis approach.44 In this paper, I analyse the replies that
were considered by the authors as illustrative of each thematic category
that emerged from the content analysis.
10 Exchange project (http://exchange.ics.uminho.pt/).
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5. National Contact Points: views on the databases custody and
follow-up procedures
The Prüm System attempts to create minimum standards for data
protection in a forensic context using the two-step approach.10 At the
national level, the institution that has custody of the national forensic
DNA database is also responsible for different socio-technical imagin-
aries concerning privacy and data protection. National forensic DNA
databases may be under the jurisdiction of the Ministry of Justice or the
Ministry of Internal Affairs and the custodian can influence the flow and
fluidity of communication between the authorities of different Member-
States.
5.1. Judicial process vs police process - time-consuming vs quickness
Interviewees emphasised that the models of cooperation are de-
pendent on the custody of the respective country's database,45 wherein
the procedures involving the exchange of DNA information via the ju-
dicial authorities are slower than exchange via police institutions.45 The
following extract clearly indicates this contrast, in terms of the tardi-
ness of procedures, characteristic of judicial authorities, which, ac-
cording to the interviewee, contributes to the inefficiency of coopera-
tion in step 2 of the Prüm system:
In my country DNA is not police information. So, now what happens
[is that] if another country would like to have more information
about a person, they have to send a rogatory commission to my
country. It's very complicated, because, [if] it's in the police de-
partment, [they] phone and [asks] ‘Could you give me the name?’
and it's done. (Interview I01)
Different practices of transnational cooperation between the police
and judicial authorities may thus present an obstacle to the exchange of
information for criminal investigation purposes.45 Police institutions
operate on the principle of the maximum degree of access to available
information with the aim of advancing a criminal investigation (in-
telligence).46 On the other hand, the mode of action of judicial autho-
rities is seen to be more restrictive because it is a slower process and,
usually, results in less exchange of information.45 The scarce experience
on transnational cooperation attributed to the judicial authorities by
the police forces is, according to interviewees from the police forces,
one of the obstacles for the fluidity of the communication.45 This
happens partly because the judicial authorities are not involved in the
investigative phase. Therefore, the rationale and modus operandi of the
two institutions are different due to their different objectives in the
criminal justice system. Police forces searches for people who have
committed crimes. Judiciary systems other judges those who have (or
haven't) committed such crimes. As Machado and Granja (2019) stated:
“The clash between these different working methods (…) therefore
undermines the principle of reciprocity and trust that police profes-
sionals claim is needed within transnational cooperation and prevents
the construction of relationships based on trust with their judicial
counterparts.”45(p14)The differences between Member-States in terms of
the custody of forensic DNA databases reveals different imaginaries of
privacy and data protection as well as tensions in transnational co-
operation between police and judicial institutions. The first extract was
explicit about the difficulty in obtaining information from judicial au-
thorities. The following excerpts contain illustrative participants’ views
of cooperation. The first participant refers to the bureaucracy that is
required to request information in the judicial sphere. The second in-
terviewee identifies the frustration that can arise from failure to ex-
change information. Both excerpts express critical views about the
functioning of judicial institutions in relation to transnational co-
operation, namely, that it requires too much work to obtain informa-
tion, and frustration because of the refusal to grant information:
They send us the name of the guy, they send very few information:
name, the offence … Not automatically. So, we have a name, but if
we want to have more than that, we need to send another request.
Judicial request. (Interview H02)
I would say, sometimes it leads to more frustration. I mean,
[Country A] is so pissed at [Country B] right now. They have the
identity of a murderer, but they are refusing to give [Country A] the
information because they are under the Ministry of the Interior.
(Interview U01)
5.2. Follow-up criteria for the exchange of information
The sociotechnical imaginaries related to data protection and
privacy can also be found in the criteria decided by Member-States for
the follow-up of DNA hits/matches. As is outlined in the participants’
narratives, the criteria for following-up DNA hits differ between coun-
tries. In the following excerpts, interviewees explain that there are
countries that only exchange information in specific situations, for in-
stance, of the crime typology and seriousness in terms of the penal
framework. Some countries opt not to exchange information if they
consider the crime does not justify the sending of private information
about someone in their database. In this situation, the information held
by a Member-State is protected regardless of whether or not it may help
solve a case in a third country.
If you have a minor case, most of the time people don't make any
follow-up. (Interview H02)
So even if there is a hit, there is [still] also the option that the local
police unit decides not to start a case, because maybe it’s a too old
case (…) and maybe the prosecutor [already] closed the case and
there is nothing to do. So, they have information from the laboratory
that there is a hit, but nobody will send us a request to make a
further inquiry in the Second step. (Interview G06)
5.3. Trust between Member-States in transnational cooperation
There was one topic that was emphasised by participants, namely,
the trust between Member-States. The lack of trust that could char-
acterize countries relationships is one of the obstacles to the im-
plementation of the exchange of personal data in the Prüm sys-
tem.47(pp2−3),48 The different custodians of databases have placed a
strain on trust relations between countries. Historically, police co-
operation is permeated by informal information-exchange networks,
which do not require the presence of political negotiations between
countries.7 Judicial cooperation is characterized by a more formal and
politicized character, which is often dependent on interpersonal rela-
tions of trust between people from different countries.7 The for-
malization of the Prüm system has merged the traditional dynamics of
data exchange by allowing judicial entities to exchange data with law
enforcement agencies and vice versa.49 That said, step 2 give countries
some manoeuvre to decide which data should be exchanged. In that
sense, some countries opted to legally formalize these dispositions
while in other nations decisions over the type of data exchanged are
under the responsibility of the NCP.7
As the following quote demonstrates, the interviewee is in favour of
forcing countries to carry out step 2 of the Prüm system. The participant
argued that the police and judicial cooperation should be based on trust
and solidarity between EU Member-States.9,50
Now we have to force people to do a step 2 application. (…) Do not
ask what ministry they are from, we are cooperating within Europe,
if they ask a Prüm question and they are fully agreeable, then you
get the information. I have information, of course I want to help the
other countries. If you just filled in the paperwork correctly, we trust
you. (Interview U01)
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The interviewee's narratives showed that different options for the
databases custody and the follow-up procedures for step 2 of the Prüm
can conditionate the transnational exchange of genetic information. On
the one hand, the Member-States with judicial custody of the database
tends to negatively constraint the fluidity of the information. On the
other hand, countries with database custody under the Ministry of
Internal Affairs are more willingly to exchange DNA profiles data. Also,
the follow-up procedures explained by the participants allow the
identification of the different sociotechnical imaginaries regarding
privacy and data protection. As one interviewee said, in minor cases,
some countries opt for not exchange the information of its own citizen.
The option of do not proceed with step 2 of the Prüm system can be
seen as a measure of privacy protection. Also, through the participants'
narratives, this section highlighted some tensions on transnational co-
operation between the Member-States regarding their governance
modes of the second step of the Prüm system.
6. National Contact Points: views on restrictive and expansive
modes of forensic data exchange
Another relevant aspect of data protection and privacy imaginaries
in the context of transnational exchange is related to the restrictions
placed upon the use of the data that is sent. The categorization that will
be presented in this section is inspired by the work of Santos, Machado
and Silva.51 The authors use the categories of “restrictive countries” and
“expansive countries” to classify the insertion criteria of individuals
into national forensic DNA databases. On the one hand, the restrictive
countries instead of inserting all population that passed in the criminal
system, usually opt for a set of conditions that will determine or not the
insertion of the DNA profile on the database. Santos, Machado and Silva
classify the following countries as the restrictive ones: Belgium, France,
Germany, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Luxemburg, the Netherlands, Poland,
Portugal, Romania, Spain and Sweden. On the other hand, there are the
expansive countries that, generally, are much more inclusive in terms of
the rules to the insertion of DNA profiles on the database51(p6). In this
group are the following countries: Austria, Denmark, Estonia, Finland,
Latvia, Lithuania, Scotland Slovakia and the United Kingdom. In this
paper, I propose to expand their categorization to the type and amount
of information that is exchanged between the Member-States that are in
the Prüm system. That said, several Member-States choose to specify on
the document sent to the requesting State that the submitted data
cannot be used in their courts as such. They thereby limit their use to
the investigative stage of the criminal process. However, this option
generates different perspectives on the reciprocity implicit in interna-
tional cooperation,52 and in particular in the Prüm system, as well as
the practice of the analysis of DNA profiles. In the following quote, is
illustrated the statement that is added to the document before ex-
changing data, which means that for further information the requesting
country should send an international letter rogatory. This procedure
could, again, slow the process of transnational cooperation and also
reveals the lack of trust concerning the protection of the data by third
countries.
The following statement is always included: ‘The above information
including the personal data related to the mentioned individuals
may be released for the operational internal police use only and
cannot be used as an evidence in your respective countries. In order
to acquire evidence which can be used in legal proceedings, your
authorities should apply to the competent authorities via an inter-
national letter rogatory.’ (Interview G06)
The two-step approach aims to place more safeguards on transna-
tional data exchange.10 However, there are different modes of con-
ceiving what personal information about their own citizens should be
exchanged between Member-States. The different socio-technical ima-
ginaries regarding privacy and data protection are expressed in the
following extracts in which the interviewees explained the national
modalities about the personal data that is exchanged for criminal in-
vestigation purposes. On the one hand, there are countries that decided
to have an expansive51 approach to exchanging personal information.
In the following quote, the interviewee referred to his/her country's
expansive exchange of data to third countries:
It is of course a question of how easily countries give up those
persons, give up their information. If the country does not protect
their people, it is a problem. I am not proud to say it, but our
government does not protect our people very well. So, they give
them up quite easily. Once they get these Prüm matches they are
given up. I think it might not be only our country's problem.
(Interview B01)
On the other hand, there are Member-States that take greater con-
sideration of the kind and amount of personal information that is ex-
changed in transnational cooperation, so-called ‘restrictive’ countries.51
In the following extract, the participant explains that in his/her country
they do not exchange all the personal information that they keep. In
that national context the authorities opt for the selection of information
and only send to third countries the data that is considered to be strictly
necessary:
We don't want to send everything. We want to select the more ef-
ficient information, waiting for the country to send us an additional
request. Otherwise, if we need to have some coercion to get the
information, that will be dealt with by the judicial channel.
(Interview H02)
The differences between restrictive and expansive countries are
mainly related to the type and quantity of information exchanged via
the Prüm system. It is important to emphasise that the categories of
restrictive and expansive approaches to cooperation are not rigid. The
flow of personal information for criminal investigation purposes may
vary according to the Member-States that are involved in the data ex-
change. For instance, one country may choose to exchange more or less
information about a person in function of the requesting country, pre-
cisely because of different levels of trust between Member-States.
Generally, on the one hand, the Member-States that have attributed the
custody of the national forensic DNA database to policial authorities are
characterized for a more expansive mode of information exchange.45
On the other hand, the restrictive way of data exchange between
countries is associated with Member-States whose custody is under the
judicial entities.45 That said, the majority of the countries in the Prüm
system have their national DNA database under the Ministry of the
Interior (or Internal Affairs or Home Affairs). Only Belgium, Portugal,
the Netherlands and Sweden have their national DNA database under
the Ministry of Justice. However, it is important to emphasize that the
listed categories are flexible. Nevertheless, a country can decide for
policial custody of the national DNA database and still have a restrictive
mode of transnational information exchange.
7. Conclusion
The sociotechnical imaginaries about privacy and data protection
have shaped the trajectories of implementation of the Prüm system, as
well as the processes put in place and the application of policies re-
garding the exchange of data. At the same time, these policies have
simultaneously reinforced the specific imaginary of the risks and ben-
efits of the Prüm system. Scientific and technological practices comprise
expectations of future possibilities,53 which will consequently shape
decision-making and also the trajectories of science and technology.20
The co-construction of scientific trajectories, such as the Prüm system,
are made via understandings about the notions of the ‘common good’.
The formulation of policies regarding Prüm is permeable to several
sociotechnical imaginaries about privacy and data protection at the
national level. However, the State, in the social environment, is the
figure that has more resources and more power to define the
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sociotechnical imaginaries that will be adopted in a certain society.20
The Prüm system appeared as a response to the security concerns at
a transnational level posed to the European Union by the mobility of
persons in the wake of the Schengen Agreement.11 This system aimed to
harmonise procedures for transnational cooperation, but such harmo-
nisation is limited by social, cultural, technological and political dif-
ferences among Member-States. The automation and standardisation of
Prüm Step 1 procedures dilute differences. Nevertheless, these reappear
at the second step, due to the existence of highly heterogeneous prac-
tices at the local and global level regarding privacy and data protection
in sociotechnical imaginaries. The projection of the infrastructures of
the Prüm System is the result of a set of scientific, ethical, and political
options: scientific - because they need to fulfil their design remit, for
example, the comparison/evaluation of DNA profiles is a consolidated
scientific technique; ethical - because the infrastructures equate the
potential risks or errors of one technology, for instance, false positives,
privacy, abuse of power, data misuse; and political - because it was
originally intended as a voluntary cooperation mechanism, but the
Prüm system later became mandatory for the entire European Union.
The expansion of surveillance activities, such as the operation of
forensic DNA databases, demands debate, which involves the need to
find a balance between the use of surveillance for international security
and the guarantee of fundamental human rights.54 It is crucial to reflect
on the proportionality and intensity of surveillance systems that in
some circumstances could lead to the vulnerability and the stigmati-
sation of certain populations and/or individuals.12–19 Although there is
a general recognition of potential threats to the security of the Eur-
opean Union, namely terrorist attacks and trans-border criminality, not
all the interviewed professionals of the Prüm system – the NCPs – have
the same sociotechnical imaginaries concerning privacy and data pro-
tection.
The research data that was explored in the paper challenge the
notion of a unified European Union in terms of policial and judicial
cooperation. The tensions highlighted can be the result of different
national sociotechnical imaginaries regarding the privacy and data
protection of the personal information of their own citizens. However,
due to the lack of official reports and statistics, it is not feasible to
deeply analyze some subjects, for example, regarding the type and
amount of information that is exchanged between the Prüm system
members.
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